State of Utah v. Donald Wayne Butcher : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1992
State of Utah v. Donald Wayne Butcher : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Michael D. Murphy; Attorney for Appellant.
R. Paul Van Dam; Attorney General; Joanne C. Slotnik; Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys for
Appellee.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Butcher, No. 920252 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/4180
B¥ ID 
_.-. THt '. . •! 
0 
OK:-. 
:^c-?s x 
STATE "0/UTAH, : 
i> Id i nt 1 J. f /Appe.l I I'C, s 
v . : 
D O N A L ~ V...i>-' BUT' H E R. : 
OF APPEALS 
Case No. 920252-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APFELLFE 
THIS IS AN APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION FOR 
BURGLARY, A SECOND DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION 
OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-202 (1990), IN THE 
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
DAVIS COUNTY, UTAH, THE HONORABLE DOUGLAS L. 
CORNABY, PRESIDING. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 13 2?) 
Attorney General 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIh v * * - * / 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1022 
MICHAEL 
93 So. Man. 
Suite 4 
Kaysville, 
Telephone: 
ft t- i- nrnciv f •' 
QRPH 
Stre 
801) 
(5_15 j 
J4037 
547-92'74 
1 l*«t 
wi- **»•. X~^ Fl 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
DONALD WAYNE BUTCHER, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 920252-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
THIS IS AN APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION FOR 
BURGLARY, A SECOND DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION 
OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-202 (1990), IN THE 
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
DAVIS COUNTY, UTAH, THE HONORABLE DOUGLAS L. 
CORNABY, PRESIDING. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312) 
Attorney General 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK (4414) 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1022 
Attorneys for Appellee 
MICHAEL D. MURPHY (5115) 
93 So. Main Street 
Suite 4 
Kaysville, Utah 84037 
Telephone: (801) 547-9274 
Attorney for Appellant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF 
APPELLATE REVIEW 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES . 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 2 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 4 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT WAS AMPLY 
SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S INTENT TO 
COMMIT A THEFT INSIDE THE BRADSHAW HOME. 
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION, THEREFORE, SHOULD BE 
AFFIRMED 4 
CONCLUSION 6 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED 
Page 
State v. Isaacson. 704 P.2d 555 (Utah 1985) 4' 
State v. Tellav. 324 P.2d 490 (Utah 1958) 4 
State v. Walker. 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987) 2 
State v. Wilson. 701 P.2d 1058 (Utah 1985) 5 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1990) 1, 2 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (Supp. 1992) 2 
11 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : Case No. 920252-CA 
DONALD WAYNE BUTCHER, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant.: 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction of burglary, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1990). 
This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Was the evidence of defendant's intent to commit a theft once 
he had unlawfully entered the Bradshaw home sufficient to support 
his conviction for burglary? 
This Court will not overturn a trial court's verdict unless it 
is clearly erroneous. This standard "requires that if the findings 
(or the trial court's verdict in a criminal case) are against the 
clear weight of the evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise 
reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
made, the findings (or verdict) will be set aside." State v. 
Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann, § 76-6-202 (1990), governing the crime of 
burglary, provides: 
(1) A person is guilty of burglary if he 
enters or remains unlawfully in a building or 
any portion of a building with intent to 
commit a felony or theft or commit an assault 
on any person. 
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree 
unless it was committed in a dwelling, in 
which event it is a felony of the second 
degree. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Following a bench trial on December 30, 1991, defendant was 
convicted of burglary, a second degree felony (T. 52 or addendum 
A). After a 60-day evaluation, he was sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of 1 to 15 years in the Utah State Prison. The 
court also levied a fine of $5000 and a surcharge of $1250 (R. 29 
or addendum B). On appeal, defendant asserts that the evidence of 
his intent to commit a theft, a necessary element of this burglary, 
was insufficient to support his conviction for burglary. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On October 10, 1991, just before noon, Vicki Bradshaw was home 
alone in a half-basement living space, talking with her mother on 
the telephone (T. 18-19). Looking out through sliding glass doors 
into her backyard, she saw a man, later identified as defendant, 
"just sort of tiptoeing" (T. 21). She told her mother she "had to 
go," hung up the phone, and then immediately dialed 911. She took 
the telephone, hid behind a "great big couch chair" in the corner 
of the room, and continued to watch out the sliding glass doors, 
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describing what she was observing to the dispatcher (T. 22). 
Defendant checked the sliding glass doors, discovered they 
were unlocked, and then closed the doors again. Mrs. Bradshaw 
testified that defendant then went out of her line of vision, but 
that she heard him open and close a door in the garage. She then 
observed him peek in a large window by the front door and peek in 
the door itself (T. 23).l She also heard him check the door, which 
was locked (T. 24). 
Defendant returned to the sliding glass doors, opened both of 
them, stepped inside, and closed the doors. Mrs. Bradshaw 
testified: "And just then a reflection — he just looked out and 
turned around and opened the door and ran like heck" (T. 25). 
According to Mrs. Bradshaw, defendant ran from the premises 
just as the police arrived. She, and apparently defendant as well, 
had seen the reflection of the arriving police cars in the windows 
(T. 25). Mrs. Bradshaw watched defendant jump the fence 
surrounding her property and flee through an adjoining pasture. 
The police apprehended him soon thereafter. 
The police officer who read defendant his Miranda rights 
testified that defendant told him he had been looking for water in 
the Bradshaw backyard. Mrs. Bradshaw testified that functional 
water faucets were located "all around the house" (T. 31), 
including one "right by the door where [defendant] came in" (T. 
30). The police recovered a half-full plastic water bottle just 
1
 Mrs. Bradshaw's hiding place was apparently only about 
three feet away from the front door (T. 23). 
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outside the Bradshaw fence that defendant said belonged to him (T. 
48). Defendant also told the officer that he couldn't remember if 
he had entered the residence because he had been drunk for the last 
month and that "I might have been looking for alcohol" (T. 47). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The evidence of defendant's intent to commit a theft may be 
inferred from defendant's conduct or the surrounding circumstances. 
In this case, although defendant claimed he was looking for water, 
he already had a gallon jug half full of water, and there was a 
functional water faucet located outside by the door where defendant 
entered the home. In addition, defendant checked the doors and 
windows prior to entering, presumably to assure himself that no one 
was at home. The trial court reasonably concluded that, under such 
circumstances, defendant's behavior indicated that, once inside, he 
intended "to commit a theft of some kind" (T. 51). Because the 
court's verdict was not clearly erroneous, defendant's conviction 
should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT WAS AMPLY 
SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S INTENT TO 
COMMIT A THEFT INSIDE THE BRADSHAW HOME. 
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION, THEREFORE, SHOULD BE 
AFFIRMED. 
"Intent may be inferred from the actions of the defendant or 
from the surrounding circumstances." State v. Isaacson. 704 P.2d 
555, 558 (Utah 1985). This holds true "even though nothing is 
actually taken." State v. Tellav, 324 P.2d 490, 490-91 (Utah 
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1958). Indeed, ,f[t]he fact that nothing was missing when 
[defendant] was apprehended is no defense to the burglary charge, 
nor does it destroy the inference of intent to steal at the time of 
entry." State v. Wilson, 701 P.2d 1058, 1060 (Utah 1985) (citing 
State v. Sisneros, 631 P,2d 856 (Utah 1981)). 
In this case, the court made two specific findings from which 
defendant's intent to commit a theft may be inferred. The 
findings are based on testimony from the woman who witnessed the 
entire event, statements defendant made to the police officer who 
read him his Miranda rights, and evidence found at the site (R. 51-
2 or addendum A). 
First, defendant explained his presence by telling a police 
officer that "he had been looking for water in the backyard" (T. 
47). Indeed, defendant claimed that a gallon water jug found by 
officers just outside the Bradshaw fence belonged to him. The jug, 
however, was half-full of water at the time, and Mrs. Bradshaw 
testified that not only were there functional water faucets located 
around the perimeter of the house, but also that there was one 
located "right by the door where [defendant] came in" (T. 30). In 
ruling out defendant's claimed purpose of obtaining water, the 
court stated: "If he had wanted water, of course, he already had a 
half gallon of water. If he wanted more, he could have filled it 
up from the outside" (T. 51-2). 
Second, prior to entering the home, defendant checked the 
sliding glass doors, the garage door, the front door and, 
additionally, peeked in the window. The court understood these 
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actions as defendant's way of assuring himself that no one was home 
prior to entering the dwelling (T. 52). 
Looking at the uncontroverted testimony of the witness to the 
event, defendant's statements to the police officer, the presence 
of outdoor water faucets at the home, and the water jug found at 
the site, the court reasonably inferred: "So his purpose in going 
in was to commit a theft of some kind" (T. 52). Because the 
finding of intent to commit a theft can be easily inferred from 
defendant's actions or the surrounding circumstances, defendant's 
conviction for burglary should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
Evidence of defendant's intent to commit a theft once he had 
unlawfully entered the Bradshaw home was sufficient to support his 
conviction for burglary. The decision of the trial court should, 
therefore, be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this I day of December, 1992. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
1 I whether he might have been in the home? 
2 A He made some other references, but not specifically 
3 to why he was in the home. 
4 MR. HARWARD: I have no other questions. 
5 J MR. ALBRIGHT: I have nothing of this witness, your 
6 Honor. 
7 THE COURT: You may step down. Thank you. 
8 MR. HARWARD: State rests. 
9 MR. ALBRIGHT: Defense would rest, your Honor. 
10 THE COURT: Closing argument? 
11 MR. HARWARD: No. We're willing to submit it. 
12 MR. ALBRIGHT: Submit it. 
13 THE COURT: It appears clear from the testimony given 
14 before the Court that on October 10th, 1991, at Woods Cross 
15 at the home of Vicki Bradshaw, 1017 West 1050 South in Woods 
16 Cross, that the defendant in the courtroom having been 
17 identified did, in fact, enter that residence. One of the 
18 elements of the offense is that it be done with the intent to 
19 commit a theft or commit some other crime. This particular 
20 one alleges with an intent to commit theft. 
21 He indicated to the officer that he entered for the 
22 purpose of getting water. It's been testified that there was 
23 water taps on the outside, also that he had a water bottle, 
24 Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, half full of water at the time. A 
25 gallon jug half full of water. If he had wanted water, of 
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2 more, he could have filled it up from the outside. 
3 And so the Court cannot find that there was any 
4 other purpose in entering the residence, he having apparently 
5 satisfactorily assured himself that there was no one inside 
6 the residence since Vicki Bradshaw was concealing herself 
7 from where he could see her. So his purpose in going in was 
8 to commit a theft of some kind. 
9 That the officers arrived before he could commit a 
10 theft. Clearly he's guilty of burglary, a felony of a second 
11 degree. The Court will so find. 
12 We'd like to set it for sentencing. Is that 
13 agreeable, counsel? 
14 MR. ALBRIGHT: Your Honor, if I may, I've talked with 
15 Mr. Butcher about sentencing. And we would waive time. And 
16 I have discussed this with Mr. Harward as well, and that is 
17 that 60-day evaluation would be appropriate. Mr. Butcher in 
18 the past has had a 90-day evaluation. 
19 THE COURT: How long ago. 
20 MR. ALBRIGHT: I think it was about two or three years. 
21 MR. BUTCHER: Four years it's been. 
22 MR. ALBRIGHT: Four years ago. So it's been some time. 
23 THE COURT: Was that at the state prison? 
24 MR. ALBRIGHT: Yes,; it was. 
25 THE COURT: And what was that for? What were you 
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ADDENDUM B 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL "DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS*,' STATE ^ F /folfifo 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DONALD WAYNE BUTCHER, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT 
TO THE UTAH STATE PRISON 
Case No. 911707459 
That whereas said defendant, having plead guilty to 
the crime of burglary, a felony of the second degree, and now 
being present in Court accompanied by his attorney and ready for 
sentence, thereupon the Court renders its judgment. 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT: 
The defendant is sentenced to the Utah State Prison 
for an indeterminate term of 1 to 15 years and fined $5,000 plus a 
surcharge of $1,250. 
Dated this 17th day of March, 1992, with the Seal of 
the Court affixed hereto. 
PAULA CARR 
ClerX of Court 
:hy PotQts 
''Hiww^ 
By. 
Kathy 
Deputy Clerk 
i ' i » 0101095 
